The Peace Process: Key Facts

  • The internal armed conflict in Burma has lasted nearly 70 years.
  • The current peace process was launched after the U Thein Sein administration took office in 2011.
  • Bilateral ceasefires between the government and 15 different EAOs were signed between 2011 and 2013.
  • In March 2015, the draft text of the NCA was approved by the government and the main EAO negotiating body at the time, the NCCT. As the government subsequently excluded the AA, TNLA and MNDAA from the NCA, most groups refused to sign the non-inclusive pact. Nevertheless, in October 2015, eight organizations (see The Peace Process: Main Actors) signed the agreement, which resulted in further splits and divisions in the peace process and conflicts between the EAOs that signed the pact and those that did not.
  • The peace process progressed little in the lead-up to the November 2015 elections which saw the coming to power of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD.
  • The first Union Peace Conference (UPC) was organised in January 2016 under U Thein Sein’s administration.
  • The second UPC, known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC) took place between August 31-September 3, 2016.
  • The second 21CPC took place between May 24-29, 2017.
  • The third 21CPC took place on July 11-July 16, 2018.
  • The Peace Conferences were initially meant to take place every six months.

 

The Peace Process: Main Actors

The Burma Government

  • Governing party: National League for Democracy (NLD)
  • Negotiating body: Peace Commission (PC)
  • Technical body: National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC)

 The ‘Nationwide’ Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)

  • Signatories in October 2015: RCSS/SSA-S; KNU, DKBA, KNU/KNLA-PC, ALP, CNF, PNLO and ABSDF
  • Additional signatories in February 2018: NMSP and LDU
  • Negotiating body: Peace Process Steering Team (PPST)

The NCA Process

  • Body mandated to oversee NCA implementation: Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM)
  • Body charged with military and ceasefire matters: Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC)
  • Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC): tripartite body composed of 16 members from each block: EAO signatories; the government, parliament and military; and political parties. It is chaired by DASSK and is in charge of the political dialogue and coordinates the peace process.
  • Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD): framework for the mandate and organization of NCA participants to the Peace Process.

The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)

  • Members (as of the end of July 2018): SSPP/SSA-N, NMSP, KNPP, LDU, and ANC.
  • The SSPP/SSA-N submitted its resignation in August 2017, but has yet to be officially removed.
  • The NMSP and LDU remain UNFC members after signing the NCA in February 2018.
  • In February 2018, the UNFC announced the readmission of KNO and CNF. Their formal reinstatement has not yet been announced.
  • The KIO is an associate alliance member organization, allowing the KIO to attend meetings and provide advice.
  • Negotiating body: Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN)

The Union Political Dialogue Negotiation Committee (UPDNC) / Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee (FPNCC) / Pangkham (or Panghsan) alliance

  • Members: KIO, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, TNLA, MNDAA, AA, and the UWSA (the alliance’s leading organization)
  • Resulted from three-day EAO summit in Panghsang (the UWSA headquarters) in April 2017. Shortly after their formation, they signed a joint-statement rejecting the NCA.

 

The third 21CPC in brief

  • The Third UPC – 21CPC took place in Naypyidaw on July 11-16, 2018.
  • Several reasons explain the more than seven-months delay, notably the NMSP and LDU signing the NCA, and subsequent NSMP attempt to organize national dialogue in preparation for the conference; and NCA breaches by the BA in Karen State and subsequent outbreak of fighting between the BA and the KNU.
  • The third 21CPC was attended by NCA signatories as well as non-signatories. The latter included all seven members of the FPNCC, as well as parties such as the KNPP and NSCN-K, and were invited as observers only.
  • Out of the 32 originally proposed discussion points, only 12 points had been approved by the UPDJC for formal consideration. Most rejected points concerned political and economic issues, which only consist of -respectively – two and one – of the final 12 points. Both political issues relate to gender – notably a 30 percent quota for women’s participation in politics.
  • Part two of the Union Accord was drafted by the end of the conference, and 14 principles which had been discussed and approved were signed: 4 political, 1 economic, 7 social and 2 regarding land issues. No progress was made on security issues.
  • DASSK announced her intention to organize another peace conference before the end of the year, and several more in 2019 and 2020.

 

Post-21CPC: A critical perspective

  • The conference was marked by controversy and disagreement, and some EAOs wrote it off as merely symbolic even prior to the event.
  • The NMSP reported UPDJC-imposed restrictions which made it impossible to carry out national dialogue prior to the UPC despite having signed the NCA in February 2018.
  • BA Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing’s opening speech sparked backlash from EAOs, external observers, and general public. The claim that ethnic groups are to blame for the delayed peace negotiations and the continuation of armed conflict was particularly reprimanded. His statement that the Burma Army is “an organization representing the state and people” led scores of social media users to share the message “Tatmadaw doesn’t represent me’.
  • Participants and observers alike were frustrated by the restricted list of issues (12 out of 32 in total) approved by the UPDJC for discussion. Many reported that neither did the resulting 12 points deal with contentious issues nor did they satisfy the high ethnic demand to discuss land and political issues. Critics blame the tripartite organization of the UPDJC, which entails that a point can be removed from the discussion if opposed by one of the blocs – giving the government and military bloc the power to veto contentious points.
  • While 14 points were signed in part two of the Union Accord, it pales in comparison with part one of the accord, signed during the last 21CPC. In the last conference, 37 out of 45 points for discussion were adopted: -12 within the political sector; 4 on social policy; 10 on land and environment policies; and 11 economic principles. It also remains unclear how the signed principles will be applied or integrated in the 2008 Constitution.

 

Areas of contention: Non-secession from the union

  • Non-secession was not discussed in the third 21CPC.
  • During a press conference which took place after the second 21CPC, on June 1st, 2018, SNLD expressed its opposition to the inclusion of non-secession in peace process agreement. SNLD wants the Union to be based on trust and not suspicion or threat; and argues that secession is contrary to the 1947 Panglong Agreement spirit (which proclaimed “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas”). The CNF and RCSS have also taken a strong stance against the inclusion of non-secession, the latter deeming it to be incompatible with federalism.
  • Other groups expressed willingness to accept the non-secession clause on the condition of the provision of human rights and respect of rights of self-determination, while assuring they have no desire to leave the Union.
  • Upon signing the NCA, EAOs also agreed to the three national causes upheld by BA: “non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and perpetuation of national sovereignty”. In practice, this means NCA-signatory EAOs cannot support any movement favoring independence or secession.
  • When the non-secession clause was dropped at the end of the second 21CPC, BA insisted that the drafting of States and Regions’ independent constitutions also be dropped. The move was considered as part of the BA’s broader “give-and-take” tactics to make self-determination and state constitutions conditional on acceptation of the non-secession clause. Observers of the proceedings supported the view that BA’s insistence on non-secession is a form of distrust and is not ultimately compatible with federalism.

 

Areas of contention: The federal army

  • The BA insists on a single army (“Union Army” or “Standard Army”) which would maintain the Burman-dominated status-quo within military and commanding leadership. But given Burma’s history, EAOs wish to retain the capacity to fight off or deter potential attacks from the BA.
  • EAOs want a “Federal Army” which takes orders from a federal union government, allowing them to keep their respective armed forces (weapons and personnel). BA, however, claim this is a potential threat to territorial integrity and national solidarity, and that it would weaken the Union’s potential to oversee the state and regional governments.
  • The NLD supports that the BA be placed under the control of an elected government, which also translates a certain concern regarding the BA’s army role vis-à-vis the government.

 

The role of the UNFC

  • Although a number of powerful EAOs have left the alliance since 2014 (including the KNU and KIO), the UNFC continues to uphold ethnic unity and to work towards establishing a genuine federal union based on democracy, equal rights, and self-determination.
  • The UNFC is currently made up of both NCA signatories and non-signatories. The alliance now works with flexibility to maintain unity across different EAOs’ circumstances to achieve more successful negotiation and NCA implementation based on unity.
  • The UNFC continues it work to develop collective federal principles and policies as well as to promote unity and cooperation between EAOs.

 

The UPDNC / FPNCC / Pangkham (or Panghsan) alliance and the role of China

  • The FPNCC is not formally recognized by the government and the BA.
  • During the 21 CPC, the government and the military met with the FPNCC in sidelines of the event, separately in two groups: the UWSA, NDAA, KIA and SSPP on the one; the TNLA, AA and MNDAA on the other.
  • The FPNCC submitted its proposal for a national ceasefire agreement to the government and the BA at the second 21CPC in 2017 and was hoping it would be discussed at the third session.
  • While the proposal was not discussed at third 21CPC, the FPNCC vows to continue the meetings in the future.
  • When meeting with the TNLA, AA and MNDAA group, it was reported that the BA offered the participants to sign bilateral agreements and engage in discussions leading to the signature of the NCA, provided they disarm prior to the bilateral agreement, unacceptable condition for the EAOs.
  • China continues to be heavily involved in the peace process, with numerous allegations that the country pushed for this year’s FPNCC attendance of the 21CPC. China’s motivation is most likely backed by “One Belt One Road” economic plans which would necessitate the Burma-China border to be free from armed conflicts.
  • The UWSA, Burma’s largest non-state armed group and leading actor of the FPNCC, is backed by China. With the exception of the KIO, the FPNCC members have significantly benefited from Chinese weaponry.
  • Some sources suggest China may also seek to split the FPNCC, making it easier to manipulate and control its member EAOs.

 

Information updated August 21, 2018.